The first is the rearrangement of politics away from a rift between the left and the right, in a line between “radical” centrism and populism. The center-left Socialists and the center-right candidate Les Républicains both received less than 5% of the vote, a lower percentage than any of these parties had ever received. Both Macron and Lepen see themselves as “beyond left and right” – that is, although they both want to be seen as opposites, they actually reflect each other. From a democratic point of view, this rearrangement is catastrophic. The second trend is the seemingly relentless rise of the far right in France. It’s not just that between them Le Pen and far-right opponent Eric Zemour received 30% of the vote – more than Macron. It is also the way in which the far right has put the agenda on French politics in general over the last five years, as evidenced by the way in which, even during the campaign, center-right candidates such as Valérie Pécresse adopted tropes such as the idea of a “Major replacement”. Macron’s bid for a second term can be seen as the last breath of French center-left pro-Europeanism Perhaps the only surprise in the first round was that Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the far-left Eurosceptic leader of La France Insoumise, received 22% of the vote, up from 20% in 2017 and just 1% less than Le Pen. His success shows that, despite the rise of the far right, the left is also quite strong in France, although it has distanced itself from the Socialist Party, whose candidate, the mayor of Paris, Ann Indalgo, won less than 2%. In other words, the left in France is now basically Eurosceptic. In fact, Macron’s attempt for a second term can be seen as the last breath of French center-left pro-Europeanism. It may come as a surprise to hear Macron, who is ridiculed as the “president of the rich”, described as center-left. But he was once a minister in the government of François Hollande, the last socialist president. Looking at the larger trajectory of the French center-left and its relationship with the European Union, we can see how Macron represents the end of an era. When François Mitterrand was elected French president in 1981 amid rising inflation and unemployment, he promised state-led growth as a way out of France’s economic woes. But two years later he was forced to make a U-turn as financial markets put pressure on the French franc. The center-left in France has concluded that social democratic economic policies were no longer possible at national level. As his finance minister, Jacques Delors, put it, France had a choice between Europe and decline. The problem with this pro-European strategy has always been Germany or, rather, France’s inability to persuade Germany to pursue a center-left economic policy, especially after the creation of the European single currency, which constitutionalized German preferences by limiting the ability of governments. to borrow and spend. After the start of the euro crisis in 2010, first Nicolas Sarkozy and then Hollande tried – and failed – to persuade Germany to relax the fiscal rules of the eurozone. When Macron became President in 2017, he made one last attempt to mislead Germany into making concessions. He proposed “a Europe that protects”, in which the eurozone will be reformed to protect citizens from the market. He undertook difficult labor market reforms to gain credibility in Berlin. But while many were appalled by how well Le Pen did in the 2017 election and realized that Germany needed Macron to succeed, Chancellor Angela Merkel ignored his proposals for a more redistributive EU. Only 32% of French people trust the EU – a lower rate than any other Member State “Pro-Europeans” claim that the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 changed the game. In particular, they see a major breakthrough in the creation of a € 750 billion recovery fund, which some, such as German Chancellor Olaf Solz, then Merkel’s finance minister, have even called the EU a “Hamilton moment”. recovery fund reduced the pandemic economic impact itself, did nothing to reduce the macroeconomic imbalances that already existed within the euro area. In any case, these developments do not seem to have prevented the rise of Euroscepticism in France. According to new Eurobarometer data released last week, only 32% of French people trust the EU, a lower figure than any other Member State. Meanwhile, under pressure from the far right, Macron reinvented the idea of a “Europe that protects” in terms of cultural rather than economic protection, completing his journey from the center-left to the center-right. In contrast to 2017, many in France are worried that Le Pen could really win this time around, especially if a significant number of Melanson’s voters abstain in the second round. (He has told them carefully that they should not give Le Pen a “single vote” without telling them to vote for Macron.) But even if Macron wins, he will face the same problems as before. In particular, unless the EU’s fiscal rules are reformed, it is difficult to see how it can offer much on the economic issues that matter to French voters. Like Le Pen, Melanson has somewhat reduced his Euroscepticism – both are now talking about changing the EU from within instead of leaving it, although some worry that this could make the EU even more dysfunctional. But whether Macron stays for another five years or not, future French presidents on the left are likely to be less pro-European – and more confrontational with Germany – than their predecessors. Hans Kundnani is a senior researcher at Chatham House and author of The Paradox of German Power
