Russian forces have fought in Ukraine, failing to achieve any of their primary goals after two months of fighting. Moscow has diminished its ambitions by focusing on eastern Ukraine. It seems to be renewing its attack, but its performance has already affected assessments of its military capability, calling into question its status as a “near-equal” force. Among the Russian units affected is the famous Spetsnaz. During and after the Cold War, these special pilots achieved legendary status in the West. Recent successes in Crimea and Syria have seemed to add to their credentials. Along with the rest of the Russian army, however, their reputation is tarnished in Ukraine. The city of Irpin, just miles from Kyiv, was the base of Russian special operations forces until Ukrainian forces overthrew the Russians in late March. The brutal battle for the port of Mariupol – the kind of strategic target where Moscow has concentrated its most capable forces – seems to have had a huge impact on Russia’s special pilots.
Spetsnaz: Russian Special Operators
Troops with the 14th Special Purpose Brigade of the Russian Army during exercise, February 15, 2017. Russian Ministry of Defense / Mil.ru
Moscow established Spetsnaz, its first special operations unit, in the 1950s to conduct strategic missions. Spetsnaz originally had a strategic role, but now every unit of special operations in the Russian army, law enforcement and emergency and security services is called Spetsnaz. In general, Spetsnaz military units are a light airborne infantry force that can act as shock troops. Some elite Spetsnaz units, such as the Alpha and Vympel teams, have strategic missions, such as the fight against terrorism, the fight against proliferation and the security of nuclear facilities. There have been limited reports of what Russian special operations units have done in Ukraine or how they did it, but their missions there may include special reconnaissance, direct-action operations and unconventional warfare. One of the few advantages the Russian military has taken over Ukraine is long-range weapons. Russia has launched more than 1,500 ballistic missiles and cruise missiles at Ukrainian targets. Troops of the 2nd Special Purpose Brigade of the Russian Army, a Spetsnaz GRU Brigade, during exercise. Konstantin Morozov / Russian Ministry of Defense / Mil.ru Russian special pilots could penetrate close to these targets and use specialized equipment to assist in guiding the ammunition. Moscow’s complete indifference to collateral damage means it may not use such targeting aid, but this set of skills could be used if the Kremlin wants to oust the Ukrainian leadership with a strategic strike. Russian special operations forces may also conduct immediate operations, such as raids and ambushes, to pursue regular-level objectives, such as seizing a plot of land. In general, it would be foolish to use specialist operators for conventional operations, as their potential losses would be a waste of time and money used for their high-level training, but a lack of progress may push Russian commanders to do so, especially in urban areas where training Russian commandos at close range could make the difference between victory and defeat. Russia can also use its special operations forces for unconventional warfare and asymmetric operations. Russian forces have been supporting separatist forces in eastern Ukraine for years, and this effort could be expanded as Moscow redirects its military campaign to the region. Russian special pilots may also target Ukraine’s strategic targets, such as airports or fuel and weapons depots. There have already been reports of Russian naval commandos attacking a Ukrainian military intelligence ship.
Learning from the enemy
Members of the Special Purpose Brigade of the 22nd Special Guard of the Russian Army during exercise, November 24, 2017. Russian Ministry of Defense / Mil.ru
In terms of special operations forces, the Russian military has had many opportunities to learn from the United States. For the past 20 years, US specialist pilots have been at the helm. Their ability to carry out high-paying missions with less military or civilian risk than larger conventional units has made them a choice for American politicians. The Russian army began a major reorganization in 2008, part of which was the formation of a special operations management organization. The Russian Special Operations Forces Command, established in 2009, is a strategic-level special operations organization tasked with the most difficult, most important missions. “The Russians are not stupid. They would have seen how successfully we used the SOF [special-operations forces] fall during GWOT [Global War on Terror] and have kept their notes. “That’s what we would do,” a retired Delta Force pilot told Insider. What Russian forces have learned about the military doctrine is not clear, but the open source information showed “how our operations affected their equipment and training,” the retired pilot said, speaking anonymously because they are still working with their unit. . Troops of the 22nd Special Purpose Brigade of Special Guards of the Russian Army during exercise, November 24, 2017. Russian Ministry of Defense / Mil.ru “It’s funny because sometimes it’s hard to tell the difference between an American and a Russian operator because they both tend to wear MultiCam [camouflage], high-cut helmets and carry similar offensive loads. “Only from the weapons can you really see the difference,” the former pilot added. Moscow used the creation of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is part of the US Special Operations Command, as a model for its new administration. Although smaller than Russia’s new administration, the JSOC contains the US Army’s special mission units, the most elite special operations organizations that make up the US mission’s national strike force. Moscow wanted to repeat the effectiveness of the JSOC, bringing together its top specialist operations units to facilitate better administration and control. Even Spetsnaz units from the GRU, the Russian military intelligence service, were transferred to the new organization, although they were relocated to the GRU in 2013. “People at SOF tend to be cut from the same fabric. Training, mission sets and funding may be different – and in some cases worlds apart – but people at higher levels tend to be very similar,” said the retiree. operator. Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a veteran of the Greek Army (national service in the 575th Marine Battalion and Army Headquarters) and a graduate of Johns Hopkins University.